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Abstract
The archipelagic regime, one of the novel aspects of UNCLOS, is a quartum genris, combining 
characteristics of internal waters, territorial sea and straits used for international navigation. 
The present article assesses the relevant UNCLOS provisions, by themselves, and in light of the 
South China Sea and Düzgit Integrity awards. The former clarifies the conditions under which 
a State may draw archipelagic baselines, the second postulates that, beyond various obligations 
expressly provided for in the Convention, the archipelagic State must exercise its sovereignty 
respecting the principle of reasonabless and proportionality. It remains to be seen if these 
decisions correctly assess the state of the law and if their progressive development dimension 
will ripen into consensual interpretation of Part IV UNCLOS.
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I.  INTRODUCTION
The archipelagic claim and the freedom of the high seas have always 
entertained a conflictual relationship: the archipelagic status meaning 
full and unimpaired sovereignty over the large sea areas connecting 
the islands, it reduces the areas where the principle of mare liberum is 
applicable. The stakes are high particularly in the waters off South East 
Asia, where Indonesia’s and the Philippines’ claims include areas of 
high density of commercial navigation. 
Unsurprisingly, with its more than 14,000 islands,2 Indonesia has 
always been linked to the evolution of the law of the sea in this respect. 
1  This contribution is a modified and updated version of an article published in 
French, in Forteau, M. et all., (eds.), Traité de droit international de la mer, Paris, 
Pedone, 2018.
2  CIA, “Indonesia”, The World Factbook, gives a figure of 13,466 (available online 
at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/id.html, last ac-
cessed on 17 October 2017, but the precise number varies according to the sources, 
and the inclusion or not of low-tide elevations. 
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Interestingly, Grotius’ Mare liberum of 1609, wrote upon a request of 
legal advice from Dutch East India Company after Santa Catarina’s 
incident,3 served justifying the end of the Portuguese trading monopoly 
in the Malucca archipelago. Centuries later, Indonesia’s constant claims 
to an archipelagic status led to the introduction in UNCLOS of Part 
IV (Articles 46 to 54) concerning the rights and duties of Archipelagic 
States.4 Their claim to a particular status reflects the deep connection 
between the land and the sea, essential to the identity of these States, but 
also essential for meeting their security concerns and their development 
needs. 
The history of the introduction of the archipelagic status and regime 
has been comprehensively recounted elsewhere.5 In a nutshell, prior 
to the 1951 seminal judgment of the ICJ in the Anglo-Norwegian 
Fisheries case, opposing views were expressed by States and the 
academia on the possibility for archipelagos to generate sovereignty 
over the waters surrounding and connecting them. The World Court’s 
judgment established the possibility for States to draw straight baselines 
connecting the islands and rocks bordering the coast and to delineate 
their territorial sea from these lines. The waters thus enclosed enjoyed 
the status of internal waters.6 
3  Santa Catarina was a Portuguese ship sailing from Macao to Malacca, with a great 
deal of wealth aboard. It was seized by three Dutch ships, off the coast of Singapore. 
The legality of this prize being fiercely contested, the Dutch East India Company 
called upon Grotius to draft a polemical defence of the seizure (cf. Y. Tanaka, Interna-
tional Law of the Sea, 2nd ed, CUP, 2015, p. 17; A. Kirchner, “Law of the Sea, History 
of”, MPEPIL online, MN 10).
4  For a comprehensive account on Indonesia’s impulse for the development of the 
archipelagic status, see John G. Butcher and R.E. Elson, Sovereignty and the Sea: 
How Indonesia Became an Archipelagic State, NUS Press Singapore, 2017, 530 pp.
5  J. Evensen, “Certain Legal Aspects Concerning the Delimitation of the Territorial 
Waters of Archipelagos”, UN doc. A/CONF.13/18 (1957), LoS Conferences, Official 
Documents, vol. I, pp. 289-295, available online at: http://legal.un.org/diplomatic-
conferences/lawofthesea-1958/vol/english/PrepDocs_vol_I_e.pdf, last accessed on 
17 October 2017; M. D. Santiago, “The Archipelago Concept in the Law of the Sea : 
Problems and Perspectives”, Philippine Law Journal, vol. 49, 1974, pp. 322-336; M. 
Munavvar, Ocean States: Archipelagic Regimes in the Law of the Sea, Martinus Ni-
jhoff Publishers, 1993, pp. 53-97; A. Havas Oegroseno, “Archipelagic States: from 
Concept to Law”, in D. Attard et all. (eds.), The IMLI Manual on International Mari-
time Law. Volume I :The Law of the Sea, OUP, 2014, pp. 125-136.
6  ICJ, Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries, Reports 1951, pp. 128-129.
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Inspired by this judgement, Indonesia and the Philippines attempted 
to introduce in the 1958 Geneva Conventions a similar principle for 
oceanic archipelagos. The Djuanda Declaration, of the then Prime-
minister of Indonesia (1957),7 is for the archipelagic status what was 
the Truman proclamation for the regime of the continental shelf: the 
starting point of the development of a customary rule. The declaration 
met with protests from major maritime powers and from Indonesia’s 
neighbours. The time before the adoption of the convention proved 
too short to reconcile the opposing views, thus no provision relating 
to archipelagos found its way in the 1958 Geneva Conventions. This 
failure did not prevent Indonesia or the Philippines from declaring 
themselves archipelagic States in 1960, respectively 1961, a practice 
aimed at enhancing the chances for an international recognition of the 
archipelagic status.8 
During the third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, the 
maritime powers no longer opposed these claims as a matter of 
principle, but introduced amendments protecting their interests to the 
proposals put forward by Indonesia, the Philippines, Mauritius and 
Fiji.9 The compromise was reached by limiting this particular regime 
to archipelagic States, defined as States “constituted wholly by one 
or more archipelagos and may include other islands” (Art. 46 (1) 
7  The Declaration states: “all waters surrounding, between and connecting the islands 
. . . are parts of the internal or national waters . . . Innocent passage for foreign ships 
in these internal waters is granted so long as it is not prejudicial to or violates the sov-
ereignty and security of Indonesia” (quoted in H. Caminos and V. P. Cogliati-Bantz, 
The Legal Regime of Straits. Contemporary Challenges and Solutions, CUP, 2015, p. 
174). 
8  For Indonesia: Act No. 4 Concerning Indonesian Waters, 18 Feb.1960, reproduced 
in DOALOS, Practice of Archipelagic States, 1992, pp. 45-53; for the Philippines: 
Republic Act No. 3046, An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the 
Philippines, 17 June 1961, Ibid., pp. 75-83. In the Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan 
case, Indonesia clearly explained that the “Act of 1960 was prepared in some haste, 
which can be explained by the need to create a precedent for the recognition of the 
concept of archipelagic waters just before the Second United Nations Conference on 
the Law of the Sea, which was due to be held from 17 March to 26 April 1960.” (ICJ, 
Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia), ICJ Rep 
2002, p. 680, para. 130).
9  See Virginia Center for Oceans Law and Policy, United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea 1982. A Commentary, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, vol. II, 1993, pp. 
401-403 (hereafter Virginia Commentary).
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UNCLOS),10 and by the introduction of a series of provisions preserving 
the navigational rights of the maritime powers. 
If, at the time of its adoption, Part IV of UNCLOS clearly fell 
within the progressive development of international law, meanwhile 
it has become “a norm-creating provision which has constituted the 
foundation of, or has generated a rule which, while only conventional 
or contractual in its origin, has since passed into the general corpus of 
international law, and is now accepted as such by the opinio juris, so as 
to have become binding even for countries which have never, and do 
not, become parties to the Convention”.11 Several arguments stand for 
the customary value of Part IV provisions. 
First, States have generally complied with these provisions, which 
shows that there is an opinio juris in favour of their binding character. 
Indonesia sought to bring its national legislation in conformity with 
them, even before the Convention entered into force.12 The Philippines, 
which made a declaration hardly compatible with the Convention,13 seek 
to minimize its effect potentially incompatible with the Convention.14 
10  On the distinction between archipelagic States and dependent archipelagos, see L. 
Lucchini, “L’Etat insulaire : l’impossible unité juridique”, RCADI, vol. 285, 2000, 
pp. 277-288.
11  ICJ, North Sea Continental Shelf, ICJ Rep 1969, p. 41, para. 71. In the same vein, 
C. J. Piernas, “Archipelagic Waters”, in R. Wolfrum et all (dir.), The Max Planck. 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, vol. I, MN 23, available online at http://
opil.ouplaw.com/home/EPIL (last accessed on 17 October 2017) (hereafter MPEPIL). 
12  For an analysis of the changes in Indonesian legislation, see US State Department, 
Indonesia: Archipelagic and other Maritime Claims and Boundaries, Limits in the sea, 
No. 141, 2014.
13  It states that: “The provisions of the Convention on archipelagic pas-
sage through sea lanes do not nullify or impair the sovereignty of the Philip-
pines as an archipelagic state over the sea lanes and do not deprive it of author-
ity to enact legislation to protect its sovereignty, independence, and security. 
The concept of archipelagic waters is similar to the concept of internal waters under 
the Constitution of the Philippines, and removes straits connecting these waters with 
the economic zone or high sea from the rights of foreign vessels to transit passage for 
international navigation.” The declaration basically entails that the Philippines could 
unilaterally modify the obligations arising from the Convention and suggests that the 
archipelagic status is equivalent to that of internal waters. Australia, Germany, Be-
larus, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Russia and Ukraine made objections to it. 
14  On the international level, the Philippines reacted to Australia’s objection in the 
following terms: “The Philippine Government intends to harmonize its domestic 
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More generally, the validity of proclamations of the archipelagic status 
and the domestic legislation giving effect to them are always tested 
against the conditions set out by UNCLOS, which stands for evidence 
of a generalized opinio juris. Objections to archipelagic claims based 
on their incompatibility lead the interested States to modify their 
legislation to bring it into compliance with the Convention.15
Second, several States proclaimed their archipelagic status prior to 
legislation with the provisions of the Convention.
The necessary steps are being undertaken to enact legislation dealing with 
archipelagic sea lanes passage and the exercise of Philippine sovereign rights over 
archipelagic waters, in accordance with the Convention. The Philippine Government, 
therefore, wishes to assure the Australian Government and the States Parties to the 
Convention that the Philippines will abide by the provisions of the said Convention.” 
(declaration made on 26 Oct. 1988, doc. UN ST/LEG/SER.E/25, vol. II, pp. 370 et 
379). The statement makes clear that the Philippines do not consider that they hold 
different rights from the Convention and from general international law. In 2009, 
the Philippines modified its domestic legislation to bring it in conformity with the 
Convention (US State Department, Indonesia: Archipelagic and other Maritime 
Claims and Boundaries, Limits in the sea, No. 141, The Philippines, 2014, pp. 4-5). 
A 2011 decision of the Supreme Court of the Philippines recalled that UNCLOS 
provisions on innocent passage apply in Philippine’s archipelagic waters and that 
municipal law must comply with the Convention: “In the absence of municipal 
legislation, international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS III, operate to grant 
innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the 
treaty limitations and conditions for their exercise. Significantly, the right of innocent 
passage is a customary international law, thus automatically incorporated in the corpus 
of Philippine law. No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely 
forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary international 
law without risking retaliatory measures from the international community.” (Prof. 
Merlin M. Magallona, et.al. v. Hon. Eduardo Ermita, in his capacity as Executive 
Secretary, et al. G.R. No. 187167, 16 July 2011, available online at http://sc.judiciary.
gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/august2011/187167.html (last accessed on 17 October 
2017). 
15  For examples, see ILA, Baselines under the International Law of the Sea Committee, 
Working Session Report Washington 2014, paras. 76-78, available online at: http://
www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1028 (last accessed on 17 October 
2017). The final report is expected in 2018. 
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the entry in force of UNCLOS16 or before its ratification by them,17 
which shows that their claims are founded in general international law.18 
Up to the present, 22 States have proclaimed their archipelagic status,19 
14 of which prior to the entry into force of the Convention. 
Third, States which have not ratified UNCLOS recognize nonetheless 
the validity and the international opposability of archipelagic 
proclamations, provided that the conditions set out in Part IV are met.20 
This is for instance the position of the United States, as made public 
even before the Convention entered into force: “Although the 1982 Law 
of the Sea Convention is not yet in force, the archipelagic provisions 
reflect customary international law and codify the only rules by which 
a nation can now rightfully assert an archipelagic claim.”21 Naturally, 
on this very ground, they can also challenge the validity of archipelagic 
proclamations or the measures adopted by the coastal archipelagic 
States, when exercising their sovereignty over the archipelagic waters. 
If the conventional rules could successfully ripen in customary rules, 
this is largely due to the realism and viability of the compromise reached 
16  Antigua and Barbuda, Cape Verde, Fiji, Grenade, Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, 
the Solomon Islands, the Philippines São Tomé and Principe, Vanuatu (see Practice 
of Archipelagic States, op. cit. note 9 and ILA, Baselines under the International Law 
of the Sea Committee, Working Session Report Washington 2014? available online 
at: http://www.ila-hq.org/index.php/committee-single, last accessed on 18 October 
2017). 
17  The Maldives for instance.  
18  In the same vein, K. Baumert and B. Melchior, “The Practice of Archipelagic 
States: A Study of Studies”, Ocean Development and International Law, vol. 46, 2015, 
no. 1, pp. 76-77, notes 8 et 9. (the study by L. Baumert and B. Melchior is in fact a 
summary of the studies published by the US Department of State- see fn. 45 infra). 
19  See DOALOS, Table of claims to maritime jurisdiction (as of 15 July 2011), avail-
able online at: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDF-
FILES/table_summary_of_claims.pdf (last accessed on 17 October 2017).
20  Ibid., p. 75. 
21  David H. Small, Assistant Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, Letter of 4 April 
1989, quoted in Digest of United States Practice in International Law 1981−1988, p. 
2061. See also the position articulated by the US Department of State, which clearly 
refers to the conditions established by UNCLOS for asserting the validity of archi-
pelagic claims, even in case of States which are/ were not party to the Convention 
(United States Responses to Excessive National Maritime Claims, Limits in the Seas, 
No. 112, 1992, pp. 48-51, available online at: https://www.state.gov/e/oes/ocns/opa/
c16065.htm, last accessed on 17 October 2017).
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during the third conference. The clarity of the conditions of validity of 
archipelagic proclamations, set out in Articles 46 and 47, stand at the 
basis of this successful compromise. The first part of this study will 
revisit them in light of the recent jurisprudence. The second part shows 
that the success is more mitigated insofar as the regime for the use 
of archipelagic waters is concerned. The Convention attempts to find 
the balance between the sovereignty of the archipelagic States and the 
rights of the third parties (States, but also private parties). The relevant 
provisions (Articles 49, 51, 52, 53 and 54) are expressed in ambiguous 
terms and leave much space to negotiations among the interested States. 
Even if the recent South China Sea and Düzgit Integrity awards shed 
some light upon the interpretation of these provisions, many grey areas 
of the archipelagic regime are persistent. 
A.  CONDITIONS SET OUT FOR THE VALIDITY OF 
CLAIMS TO AN ARCHIPELAGIC STATUS
1.  The Necessity of a Formal Declaration
The archipelagic status must be claimed and proclaimed; it does not 
exist ipso facto. This is what results from the Qatar v. Bahrain decision, 
where, in the absence of a formal proclamation, the ICJ examined 
Bahrain’s baseline system in light of Article 7 of UNCLOS and not 46 et 
47.22 The proclamation of the archipelagic status is made either through 
a formal declaration of the highest authority of the State, notified on 
the international level,23 or, more frequently, through the adoption 
of a system of archipelagic baselines.24 The drawing of archipelagic 
baselines is nonetheless essential for the State to enjoy the benefits of 
the archipelagic status. Seawards, archipelagic baselines will provide 
the line from which the territorial sea is to be delineated (Article 48 
of UNCLOS). Archipelagic baselines are also used in maritime 
delimitation, at least for the construction of the provisional equidistance 
22  ICJ, Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain 
(Qatar v. Bahrain), merits, ICJ Rep 2001, pp. 96-97, paras. 180-184 and pp. 102-103, 
paras. 214-215.
23  Kiribati, Bahamas and the Marshall Islands (ILA, Baselines under the International 
Law of the Sea Committee, supra, fn. 15, table in the appendix). 
24  Ibid.  
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line.25 Landwards, they will provide the line enclosing and defining the 
archipelagic waters (Article 49 of UNCLOS). The mere proclamation 
of the archipelagic status is thus of limited practical effect, being mainly 
a preparatory act announcing the State’s intention to adopt legislation 
drawing archipelagic baselines. 
Both the formal proclamation and the legislation defining the 
archipelagic baselines are unilateral acts of the State, but their 
international validity is subject to Articles 46 and 47 of the Convention. 
Claims incompatible with these provisions are unopposable to other 
States and none of the consequences specified in Part IV of UNCLOS 
(full sovereignty over archipelagic waters, measurement of the breadth 
of the territorial sea) can derive from them.26 
One may wonder if there is any time-line within which an archipelagic 
claim can be made. The answer appears to be in the negative, since 
late claims of an archipelagic status have not met with objections from 
other States.27 The same can be said for the late drawing of archipelagic 
baselines.28 However, the more a State delays it, the more the rights 
of third parties will be consolidated and protected by the archipelagic 
regime. 
25  In Barbados v. Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, the arbitral tribunal used the ar-
chipelagic baseline of Trinidad and Tobago to construct the provisional equidistance 
(Arbitration between Barbados and the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, relating to 
the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf between 
them, 11 April 2006, RIAA, vol. XXVII, pp. 244-245, para. 381). When determining 
the relevant coasts of the two States, for the purpose of appreciating their possible 
disparity as a relevant circumstance, the Tribunal however declined to substitute the 
archipelagic baselines to the geographic coasts (Ibid., p. 236, para. 334). 
26  See ICJ, Anglo-Norwegian case, supra fn. 7, p. 132. 
27  For instance, Mauritius ratified UNCLOS in 1994 and it was only in 2005 that it 
claimed archipelagic status. The Seychelles ratified UNCLOS in 1991 and claimed an 
archipelagic status in 2008 only (cf. ILA, Baselines under the International Law of the 
Sea Committee, supra, fn. 15, table in the appendix). 
28  Bahamas made the proclamation in 1993 and it is only in 2008 that it adopted the 
archipelagic baselines; les Comoros made the proclamation in 1982 and adopted the 
archipelagic baselines in 2010 (cf. V. Cogliati-Bantz, “Archipelagic States and the 
New Law of the Sea”, in Law of the Sea, From Grotius to the International Tribunal 




2.  A Faculty Limited to Archipelagic States
By its very title, Part IV clearly limits the benefit of the archipelagic 
status to archipelagic States. By the same token, it excludes the mid-
ocean archipelagos dependent on a continental State. This exclusion 
is apparent from the definition of an archipelagic State, as one formed 
only of islands.29 This decision of the drafters was deliberate and 
it can hardly be said that there is a lacuna in the Convention on this 
point30 or that “the Convention does not regulate the regime of outlying 
archipelago”.31 These doctrinal positions are not only unsupported by 
the text of UNCLOS or its travaux préparatoires, but they also at odds 
with to its object and purpose, which is to establish “a legal order for the 
seas and oceans” (UNCLOS Preamble). In particular, the Convention 
was intended to provide a comprehensive set of rules concerning 
States’ titles to maritime spaces and the claim that States could invoke 
titles to maritime spaces which are not provided in the Convention 
might undermine the balance difficulty reached during the Third UN 
Conference on the law of the sea.32 
The identification of an archipelagic State does not raise significant 
difficulties. If Article 46 of the Convention defines the “archipelago” as 
a “group of islands” and its interconnecting waters, the actual number 
of islands is unimportant. In the Düzgit Intergrity award, the Tribunal 
simply noted, without any discussion, that “São Tomé is an archipelagic 
State within the meaning of Article 46 of the Convention, and consists of 
two main islands, ‘São Tomé’ and ‘Príncipe’, and some rocky islets”.33
29  Quoted above in para. 5. 
30  For a different view, see S. Kopela, Dependent Archipelagos in the Law of the Sea, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013, pp. 112-189. 
31  Chinese Society of International Law, “The South China Sea Arbitration Awards: A 
Critical Study”, Chinese Journal of International Law, vol. 17, 2018-2, p. 486, § 473.
32  On the constitutional value of the Convention, providing for a complete set of 
rules in terms of acquisition of maritime spaces: see South China Sea (The Republic 
of Philippines v. People’s Republic of China), merits, 12 July 2016, paras. 245-246, 
253-254, 262.
33  The Düzgit Integrity Arbitration (The Republic of Malta v. The Democratic Re-
public of São Tomé and Príncipe), award, 5 September 2016, PCA case no. 2014-07, 
para. 51. In the same vein, during the arbitral proceedings in Barbados v. Trinidad and 
Tobago case, there was no opposition as to the right of the latter to declare itself an 
archipelagic State, although it is only constituted of two main islands and a number of 
small islets) (Arbitration between Barbados and the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, 
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The South China Sea award brought further clarifications on the 
scope of Part IV. First, the award draws the obvious conclusion that Part 
IV is only applicable to insular archipelagic States: 
“The use of archipelagic baselines (a baseline surrounding an 
archipelago as a whole) is strictly controlled by the Convention, where 
Article 47(1) limits their use to ‘archipelagic states’. Archipelagic 
States are defined in Article 46 as States “constituted wholly by one or 
more archipelagos and may include other islands.’ The Philippines is 
an archipelagic State (being constituted wholly by an archipelago), is 
entitled to employ archipelagic baselines, and does so in promulgating 
the baselines for its territorial sea. China, however, is constituted 
principally by territory on the mainland of Asia and cannot meet the 
definition of an archipelagic State.”34
Thus the Tribunal makes plain that States cannot draw archipelagic 
baselines around mid-ocean, dependent archipelagos and that this is 
a mere consequence of the principle that Part IV applies exclusively 
to archipelagic States. The Tribunal’s appreciation is directed to reject 
China’s assertion that “the Spratly Islands should be enclosed within a 
system of archipelagic or straight baselines, surrounding the high-tide 
features of the group, and accorded an entitlement to maritime zones 
as a single unit”.35 The Tribunal thus rejects here the possibility of 
applying the archipelagic regime to geographic archipelagos which are 
dependent on a continental State.
But the Tribunal goes even further and asserts that continental States 
cannot draw straight baselines around their outlying archipelagos, 
relying on other provisions of the Convention (in particular, on Article 
7). This conclusion however does not automatically flow from any 
specific provision of the Convention and the Tribunal reached it based 
on a contextual interpretation of Articles 7 and 47 of the Convention. The 
Tribunal’s reasoning is built in two steps: on the one hand, Article 47 is 
directed to archipelagic States, which excludes dependent archipelagos, 
and by way of consequence, a continental State cannot rely upon it to 
supra, fn. 27, pp. 147-251).
34  South China Sea (The Republic of Philippines v. People’s Republic of China), mer-




draw straight baselines around mid-ocean archipelagos. On the other 
hand, Article 7 allows for the drawing of straight baselines connecting “a 
fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity”. According to 
the Tribunal, this formula excludes the oceanic/ offshore archipelagos, 
away from the coast, from the possibility of using the system of straight 
baselines provided for in Article 7: 
“Although the Convention does not expressly preclude the use of 
straight baselines in other circumstances, the Tribunal considers that 
the grant of permission in Article 7 concerning straight baselines 
generally, together with the conditional permission in Articles 46 
and 47 for certain States to draw archipelagic baselines, excludes the 
possibility of employing straight baselines in other circumstances, 
in particular with respect to offshore archipelagos not meeting the 
criteria for archipelagic baselines. Any other interpretation would 
effectively render the conditions in Articles 7 and 47 meaningless.”36 
Thus the Tribunal draw the far-reaching conclusion that, 
notwithstanding “the practice of some States in employing straight 
baselines with respect to offshore archipelagos to approximate the 
effect of archipelagic baselines”,37 there was “no evidence that any 
deviations from this rule have amounted to the formation of a new 
rule of customary international law that would permit a departure from 
the express provisions of the Convention.”38 In short, according to the 
Tribunal, no customary rule has developed permitting States to draw 
straight baselines around offshore archipelagos. Since neither UNCLOS, 
nor customary law permit to enclose offshore archipelagos, claims to 
the contrary are incompatible with international law.39 Furthermore, the 
36  Ibid., para. 575.
37  Ibid. The Tribunal failed to mention the fact that this deviating practice met with 
strong opposition from other States, an argument which would have further supported 
its conclusions on the absence of any customary rule. See the objections by Spain, 
Greece and United Kingdom to Ecuador’s declaration under UNCLOS concerning 
the Galapagos; see also the objections to Canada’s system of enclosing the Arctic ar-
chipelago (mentioned in S. Kopela, op. cit., fn. 31, pp. 207-225). For other examples 
of objections, see ILA, Baselines under the International Law of the Sea Committee, 
supra fn. 15, para. 39, J. A. Roach and R. Smith, Excessive Maritime Claims, 3rd 
ed., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012, pp. 108-115; T. Davenport, “The Archipelagic 
Regime”, in D. Rothwell et all (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea, 
2015, p. 155.
38  Ibid., para. 576. 
39  See also E. Franckx and M. Benatar, “Straight Baselines Around Insular Forma-
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Tribunal is firm in considering that no other provision in the Convention 
could be invoked for the purposes of drawing straight baselines: tertium 
non datum.
Alongside the definition of islands and rocks under Article 121, this 
is one of the most debated issues in the Tribunal’s decision on the merits, 
which might have an influence far beyond the case sub judice. The 
conclusion of the Tribunal can be and has been contested.40 While it is 
ample demonstrated that continental States could not rely on Article 47 
of the Convention to enclose their off-shore archipelagos into a system 
of archipelagic baselines, there is nothing in the Convention to exclude 
islands’ coastlines from the benefit of Article 7, or for the matter, of 
Articles 8 to 13 (provided that they meet the conditions established 
therein). The principle according to which the land dominates the sea 
has been considered applicable to continental coastline, but also to 
islands (cf. Article 121 of UNCLOS).41 For the first time, an international 
tribunal makes a definitive statement on this point of law debated in 
the international fora. Considering the interaction between judicial 
decisions and customary law, this conclusion of the Tribunal may be 
expected to act as a break for the development of any rule concerning 
offshore archipelagos. 
tions not Constituting an Archipelagic State”, in C.J. Jenner and Truong Thuy Tran 
(eds.), The South China Sea: A Crucible of Regional Cooperation of Conflict-making 
Sovereignty Claims, CUP, 2016, pp. 186-201.
40  The critics of the award on the merits by the Chinese Society of International Law 
focus mainly on this point (Chinese Society of International Law, “The South China 
Sea Arbitration Awards: A Critical Study”, Chinese Journal of International Law, vol. 
17, 2018-2, p. 486
41  Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada v. Unit-
ed States of America), Judgment, I. C.J. Reports 1984, p. 246, para 157; Aegean Sea 
Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1978, p. 3, para. 86; 
Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar 
v. Bahrain), Merits, Judgment, I. C. J. Reports 2001, p. 40, para. 185; Territorial and 
Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua 
v. Honduras), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 659, paras. 113 and 126; Maritime 
Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, 
p. 61, para. 77; Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration between Bangladesh 
and India, PCA, Award of 7 July 2014, Case n.  2010-16, para. 279; Continental Shelf 
(Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 18, para. 73; 
Delimitation of the maritime boundary in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh v. Myan-
mar), Judgment, ITLOS Reports 2012, p. 4, para. 185.
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3. The Validity of Archipelagic Baselines 
Article 47 of the Convention establishes a series of conditions for 
the validity of archipelagic baselines, which are far more detailed than 
those set out in Article 7 for straight baselines. Some are geographic, 
objective, conditions; others are legal constraints preserving the position 
of the neighbouring States. Among the former, the ratio between the 
land of water and the area of land (Art 47(1)), which must be in between 
1:1 and 9:1 in favour of the water, “ensures that the archipelagic State 
is one in which there is a focus upon the ocean spaces which connect 
the islands, rather than a State which is dominated by large island land 
masses”.42 Two other conditions tend to prevent excessive claims: one 
establishes that the length of such baselines shall not exceed in any 
way 125 miles (Art. 47(2)) and their configuration will follow the 
general configuration of the archipelago (Art. 47(3)). Like for straight 
baselines (Art. 7 (4)), archipelagic baselines “shall not be drawn to and 
from low-tide elevations » (Art. 47 (4)) unless they are situated within 
the territorial sea of an island or if they are harbouring navigational 
installations.43 
It is relatively simple to verify compliance with these objective 
conditions with appropriate cartographic software.44 In the South China 
Sea award, the Tribunal could note without much discussion that:
“[t]he Philippines could not declare archipelagic baselines 
42  ILA, Baselines under the International Law of the Sea Committee, supra, fn. 15, 
par. 74.
43  It is on this basis, that the US and UK challenge the validity of the archipelagic 
baselines of the Dominican Republic (Text of a joint demarche undertaken by the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of Amer-
ica in relation to the law of the Dominican Republic number 66-07 of 22 May 2007, 
done on 18 October 2007, Law of the Sea Bulletin, vol. 66, 2008, p. 98).
44  The US Department of State conducted 20 analysis of the compatibility of archi-
pelagic baselines with the objective requirements (US Department of State, Limits 
in the Seas, No. 98 (São Tomé -et-Principe) (1983), No. 101 (Fiji) (1984); No. 125 
(Jamaica) (2004); No. 126 (Maldives) (2005) ; and 14 studies published in 2014 : 
No. 128 (Bahamas); No. 129 (Cap-Vert); No. 130 (Dominican Republic); No. 131 
(Trinity-and-Tobago); No. 132 (Seychelles); No. 133 (Antigua et Barbuda); No. 134 
(Comoros); No. 135 (Grenade); No. 136 (Solomon Islands); No. 137 (Vanuatu); No. 
138 (Papua New Guinea); No. 139 (Tuvalu); No. 140 (Mauritius); No. 141 (Indone-
sia); No. 142 (Philippines); et No. 144 (St. Vincent and the Grenadines). Resuming 
these studies, K. Baumert and B. Melchior, op. cit. fn. 19, pp. 60-80).
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surrounding the Spratly Islands. Article 47 of the Convention limits 
the use of archipelagic baselines to circumstances where ‘within 
such baselines are included the main islands and an area in which 
the ratio of the area of the water to the area of the land, including 
atolls, is between 1 to 1 and 9 to 1.’ The ratio of water to land in 
the Spratly Islands would greatly exceed 9:1 under any conceivable 
system of baselines.”45 
Moreover, this system including the disputed islands and rocks 
would have been contrary to paragraph 3 of Article 47, which provides 
that “the drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable 
extent from the general configuration of the archipelago”. In any case, 
the discussion is purely theoretical, since in 2009, the Philippines 
adopted archipelagic baselines only around the main islands, not around 
the small islands claimed by several States in South China Sea.46
The second category of constraints aims at protecting the rights 
of the neighbouring States. Article 47, paragraph 5 ensures that the 
neighbouring State is not enclaved by the archipelagic baselines.47 
Article 47, paragraph 6 applies when “a part of the archipelagic waters of 
an archipelagic State lies between two parts of an immediately adjacent 
neighbouring State”. In this case, the “existing rights and all other 
legitimate interests which the latter State has traditionally exercised in 
such waters and all rights stipulated by agreement between those States 
shall continue and be respected” (ibid). These two paragraphs offer to 
this particular neighbouring State the legal basis to challenge the validity 
of archipelagic baselines, for the violation of its rights and interests. 
This would appear to induce an obligation for the archipelagic State to 
consider these claims and, if they are correct, to modify its archipelagic 
baselines to accommodate them. However, this provision is of limited 
application, Malaysia being the only example of a State whose territory 
45  South China Sea award, supra fn. 35, para. 574.
46  Act No. 9522 to Amend Certain Provisions of Republic Act No. 3046, as Amended 
by Republic Act No. 5446, to Define the Archipelagic Baselines of the Philippines 
and for Other Purposes (Mar. 10, 2009),  Law of the Sea Bulletin, No. 70, p. 32. See 
also fn. 15 above.
47  On this account, Timor-Leste protested two segments of Indonesia’s archipelagic 
baselines: Timor-Leste, Note NV/MIS/85/2012, 6 Feb. 2012, available online : http://
www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/DEPOSIT/com-
municationsredeposit/mzn67_2009_tls.pdf (last accessed on 17 October 2017). 
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between the Malay Peninsula and Northern Borneo is separated by the 
archipelagic waters of Indonesia. And since, in the aftermath of the 
adoption of UNCLOS, Malaysia and Indonesia concluded a treaty in 
which their respective interests are met,48 Malaysia has not challenged 
the validity of Indonesia’s archipelagic baselines. 
B. THE REGIME OF ARCHIPELAGIC WATERS 
Article 2 of UNCLOS refers to a unitary, indivisible concept 
of sovereignty.49 However, the coastal State’s sovereignty over 
the archipelagic waters is not absolute, but subject to a number of 
obligations, specified in Articles 51 to 53 of the Convention. They relate 
to the regime of navigation, to the protection of non-navigational rights 
of third parties, and to cooperation with the international organizations 
competent for maritime and air navigation. The Düzgit Integrity tribunal 
considered that, beyond the servitudes expressly mentioned in the 
Convention, the sovereignty of the archipelagic State must be exercised 
in compliance with general principle of law, in particular the principle 
of reasonabless.
1.  A Reasonable Exercise of Sovereignty 
When an activity or situation is situated within a particular maritime 
space, it is governed by the international and domestic rules applicable 
to it. In the Düzgit Integrity arbitration, the Tribunal logically rejected 
the argument that a ship to ship transfer commenced in the territorial sea 
and continued in the archipelagic waters would fall under the territorial 
sea regime:  
“The Tribunal finds that the relevant events in this dispute occurred 
within the archipelagic waters of São Tomé and that therefore the 
relevant provisions of the Convention are those contained in Part IV. 
The Tribunal rejects Malta’s submission that by virtue of the Duzgit 
48  Treaty between Malaysia and the Republic of Indonesia relating to the legal regime 
of archipelagic State and the rights of Malaysia in the territorial sea and archipelagic 
waters as well as in the airspace above the territorial sea, archipelagic waters and the 
territory of the Republic of Indonesia lying between East and West Malaysia, 25 Feb-
ruary 1982, reproduced in Practice of Archipelagic States, op. cit. note 9, pp. 144-155.
49  “1. The sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its land territory and internal 
waters and, in the case of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters, to an adjacent 
belt of sea, described as the territorial sea.”
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Integrity’s passing through São Tomé’s territorial sea on its way to 
São Tomé’s archipelagic waters, the legal regime applicable to São 
Tomé’s territorial sea was invoked and remained applicable to the 
events that occurred within São Tomé’s archipelagic waters.”50
Beyond the limitations established in the Convention, sovereignty 
functions as a presumption that the coastal State enjoys exclusive and 
full jurisdiction over all the activities and situations situated within. This 
covers both prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction. The plenitude 
of sovereignty entails that the State can submit certain activities to 
a requirement of notification or authorisation, insofar this does not 
violate its obligations and does not impair the rights enjoyed by third 
parties in its archipelagic waters. However, in relation to navigation, 
the Convention limits considerably enforcement jurisdiction, and 
prescriptive jurisdiction to a certain extent too.51
It is incumbent upon the users of the archipelagic waters to inform 
themselves of the domestic regulations applicable therein. Even if the 
archipelagic State must give them due publicity, this requirement does 
not imply that it must sent an individual notification of the applicable 
legislation to any user. This line of reasoning was applied by the Tribunal 
in the Duzgit Integrity arbitration:
“Master knew that Duzgit Integrity had an obligation to obtain 
permission prior to entering São Tomé’s waters for making any 
transhipment. There was no obligation on São Tomé to inform Duzgit 
Integrity of that obligation separately, or to advise Duzgit Integrity to 
leave São Tomé’s waters rather than arrest the ship after it had started 
preparing STS operations with Marida Melissa.”52
The main input of the award comes from the introduction of the 
principle of reasonableness as a new limit to the exercise of archipelagic 
sovereignty: 
“The exercise of enforcement powers by a (coastal) State in 
50  The Düzgit Integrity Arbitration (Malta v. São Tomé and Príncipe), supra fn. 34, 
paras. 300-301.
51  Cf. Articles 52 and 53 of the Convention, which refer back to provisions on inno-
cent and transit passage. See also paras. 58-59 infra. 




situations where the State derives these powers from provisions of the 
Convention is also governed by certain rules and principles of general 
international law, in particular the principle of reasonableness. This 
principle encompasses the principles of necessity and proportionality. 
These principles do not only apply in cases where States resort to 
force, but to all measures of law enforcement. Article 293(1) requires 
the application of these principles. They are not incompatible with 
the Convention.”53
The case thus illustrates the tendency of UNCLOS tribunals to 
apply law exterior to the Convention.54  In Düzgit Integrity case, the 
arbitrators seemed to consider that they could not rely upon human 
rights instruments, although they were possibly more appropriate for 
assessing the lawfulness of São Tomé’s conduct.55 By contrast, the 
general principles of law may possibly irrigate many of the provisions 
in the Convention, in particular those concerning the coastal State’s 
jurisdiction to take enforcement measures. Accordingly, the Tribunal 
held that:
“The disproportionality is such that it renders the cumulative effect 
of these sanctions incompatible with the responsibilities of a State 
exercising sovereignty on the basis of Article 49 of the Convention.”56
Thus, though a default legal basis, the principle of reasonableness 
actually constituted the legal ground upon which the Tribunal found that 
São Tomé had breached its international obligations. The Tribunal made 
a distinction between the enforcement measures which, being necessary 
and proportionate, did not infringe the principle of reasonableness 
and those which did. The criteria used by the Tribunal for assessing 
disproportionality were the normality of the sanctions imposed, and the 
motives provided by the authorities in support:
“The Tribunal finds that São Tomé had the right to ensure respect 
for its sovereignty by initially detaining the vessel, requesting the 
53  Ibid., par. 209. See also, Ibid., para. 254.
54  See also The Arctic Sunrise Arbitration (Netherlands v. Russia), PCA, Award on the 
merits, 14 August 2015, Case n.  2014-02, paras. 197-199; The M/V “Norstar” Case 
(Panama v. Italy), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 4 November 2016, ITLOS 
Case n.  25, para. 110. 
55  The Düzgit Integrity Arbitration (Malta v. São Tomé and Príncipe), supra fn. 34, 
paras. 207-209.
56  Ibid., para. 261.
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Master to come onshore to explain the circumstances, and to require 
the payment of charges and fines. The Tribunal does not consider the 
IMAP fine as unreasonable or disproportionate; it was the normal 
legal penalty for the type of infringement committed by Duzgit 
Integrity. The authorities provided reasoning for the components of 
the fine to the agent of the vessels (the fine was increased due to 
operational and administrative expenses).The Tribunal finds that 
this measure fell well within the exercise by São Tomé of its law 
enforcement jurisdiction and must be given deference.”57 
By contrast, “when considered together, the prolonged detention of 
the Master and the vessel, the monetary sanctions, and the confiscation 
of the entire cargo, cannot be regarded as proportional to the original 
offence or the interest of ensuring respect for São Tomé’s sovereignty 
(including São Tomé’s interest in demonstrating that such conduct will 
not be tolerated in future cases).”58
Reasonabless is thus a principle which protects both the archipelagic 
State’s prescriptive and enforcement sovereignty (which were not 
contested as such) and the users of archipelagic waters from an arbitrary 
exercise of the sovereign powers. However, the most substantial 
restrictions to the exercise of sovereignty over archipelagic waters come 
undoubtedly from the text of the Convention itself, and they bear the 
mark of the competing interests which the drafters needed to reconcile. 
2. The Protection of Non-Navigational Rights and Interests of Third 
Parties
a.  Similarities and Differences between Article 51 and Article 47, 
paragraph 6
The non-navigational rights and interests of third parties are mainly 
protected by Article 51 of the Convention, entitled Existing agreements, 
existing traditional fishing rights and existing submarine cables.59 Its 
57  Ibid., para. 255, emphasis added.
58  Ibid., para. 260.
59  Article 51 provides that: “1. Without prejudice to article 49, an archipelagic State 
shall respect existing agreements with other States and shall recognize traditional fish-
ing rights and other legitimate activities of the immediately adjacent neighbouring 
States in certain areas falling within archipelagic waters. The terms and conditions for 
the exercise of such rights and activities, including the nature, the extent and the areas 
to which they apply, shall, at the request of any of the States concerned, be regulated 
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interpretation is highly problematic: several of its core terms are not 
defined and there is little State or judicial practice which could give 
guidance.60 Moreover, it appears to duplicate Article 47, paragraph 6, 
which also protects the rights and interests of third States.61 However 
the two provisions are different in scope and effect. They can be 
cumulatively invoked by the States fulfilling the conditions set out 
therein. But Article 47 provides to the beneficiary States (not many…)62 
a formidable tool for challenging the validity of archipelagic baselines 
proclamation. Lack of compliance with Article 51, on the other hand, 
it’s only a basis for invoking the responsibility of the archipelagic State. 
The scope of Article 51 is considerably larger than the one of Article 
47, paragraph 6. Ratione personae, Article 51 protects the conventional 
rights of “other States” (in general), and the traditional and legitimate 
rights and interests of the “immediately adjacent neighbouring States”, 
which are the States who have a border with the archipelagic State.63 
Article 47, paragraph 6 on the other hand only applies to those 
“immediately adjacent neighbouring States” whose territory is separated 
by the archipelagic waters.64
Ratione materiae, article 51, paragraph 1 protects the “existing 
agreements with other States”. On a superficial reading, this guarantee 
would appear as a mere restatement of the principle of pacta sunt 
by bilateral agreements between them. Such rights shall not be transferred to or shared 
with third States or their nationals.
2. An archipelagic State shall respect existing submarine cables laid by other States 
and passing through its waters without making a landfall. An archipelagic State shall 
permit the maintenance and replacement of such cables upon receiving due notice of 
their location and the intention to repair or replace them.”
60  Several authors underlined the vagueness and confusing drafting of Article 51 (M. 
Munavvar, Ocean States: Archipelagic Regimes in the Law of the Sea, Martinus Ni-
jhoff, 1995, p. 160; S. Kopela, Dependent Archipelagos in the Law of the Sea, Mar-
tinus Nijhoff, 2013, p. 246; H. Caminos and V. Cogliati-Bantz, op. cit. fn. 7, p. 274). 
61  See para. 23 above. 
62  Ibid.
63  In the same vein, “[t]here is no ambiguity with respect to the fact that the States 
concerned must share a border with the archipelagic State” (H. Caminos and V. Co-
gliati-Bantz, op. cit. fn. 7, p. 274).
64  Compare the different positions of two of Indonesia’s immediately adjacent neigh-
bours: Malaysia benefits from both Article 47, paragaph 6 and Article 51, whereas 
Singapore benefits only from the latter.
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servanda. However, “[i]t would indeed be incompatible with the 
generally accepted rules of interpretation to admit that a provision of 
this sort occurring in a special agreement should be devoid of purport 
or effect”.65 The effet utile of this provision is to provide a guarantee 
for preserving the continuing validity of existing agreements from the 
application of the principle of lex posterior or that of Article 311 of 
UNCLOS, both of which may lead to conclude that obligations under 
UNCLOS supersede pre-existing conventions incompatible with it.66 
Whereas Article 47, paragraph 6 solely protects rights and interests 
“traditionally exercised” in those waters, Article 51 goes beyond to 
guarantee the “legitimate interests”. These interests may be pre-existing 
or may appear after the proclamation of archipelagic waters. In short, 
Article 47 protects an existing, consolidated legal situation, whereas 
Article 51 opens the gate to the invocation by the neighbouring State 
of new considerations. The reference to rights “traditionally exercised” 
and the use of the verb “continue” in Article 47, give textual support in 
favour of this interpretation. By contrast, there is no such mention in 
Article 51, in relation to activities other than fishing. 
Article 51 protects the “legitimate activities” of third States, 
however no definition is provided for this vague term. It may be argued 
that the word “legitimate” refers both to a legitimate purpose and to 
the modalities under which these activities are carried out, which must 
respect international law. It is generally recognized that security interests 
are legitimate,67 if they are pursued in a manner compatible with the 
international obligations of the State, in particular the prohibition of the 
use of force.68 Likewise, the protection of the marine environment is not 
65  Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1949, 
p. 24 ; see also Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), Judgment, ICJ 
Reports 1994, p. 25, para. 51 ; Application of the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), 
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2011, p. 125, para. 133.
66  In the same vein, R. Churchill and V. Lowe, Law of the Sea, 1999, p. 125 ; Virginia 
Commentary, op. cit. fn. 10, p. 453; Barnes and Massarella, “Commentary of Article 
51”, in A. Proelss (ed.), UNCLOS. A Commentary, Beck, Hart, Nomos, 2017, p. 386.
67  Inter alia, ICJ, Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), ICJ 
Reports 2009, p. 128, para. 204.
68  ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, Merits, ICJ 
Reports 1986, paras. 212-214.
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only a legitimate motive for the adoption of prescriptive and operative 
measures,69 but even an obligation of parties to UNCLOS. The legitimate 
purpose and the modalities of its realization may change in time,70 and 
this likelihood of evolution pleads in favour of an interpretation of 
Article 51 open to the feature.
Articles 47 and 51 come into operation differently. Since it is 
exclusively turned towards the protection of vested rights of a very 
limited number of States, Article 47 comes into operation ipso jure. By 
contrast, Article 51 has both a retrospective and prospective scope. Thus, 
the operation of this provision is made contingent upon the subsequent 
conclusion of an agreement between the neighbouring State and the 
archipelagic State. The necessity of the conclusion of an agreement 
clearly stems from the text: 
“The terms and conditions for the exercise of such rights and 
activities, including the nature, the extent and the areas to which 
they apply, shall, at the request of any of the States concerned, 
be regulated by bilateral agreements between them.” (Article 51, 
paragraph 1)
This constitutes a real pactum de contrahendo,71 as the repetitive use 
of the verb “shall” suggests (“shall recognize”; “shall be regulated”), 
and its violation may be denounced via the mechanism of dispute 
settlement established by the Convention.
Paragraph 2 of Article 51 applies to the submarine cables laid down 
by all third States, be they neighbours or not. The archipelagic State 
69  Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Right (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Judg-
ment, ICJ Reports 2009, p. 250, para. 89.
70  Cf. mutatis mutandis, the Court’s evolutive interpretation of a 19th century treaty 
between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, in order to meet contemporary needs: “the inter-
ests which are to be protected through regulation in the public interest may well have 
changed in ways that could never have been anticipated by the Parties at the time.” 
(Ibid., p. 250, para. 89).
71  On the distinction between the obligation to negotiate (pactum de negociando) and 
the obligation to conclude (pactum de contrahendo), see, PCIJ, Railway Traffic be-
tween Lithuania and Poland, Series A/B, n.  42, p. 116 ; ICJ, Application for Revision 
and Interpretation of the Judgment of 24 February 1982 in the Case concerning the 
Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), ICJ Reports 1985, pp. 218-219, 
para. 48; Arbitration between Barbados and the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, 
supra fn. 27, p 227, para. 292. 
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must respect them and allow for their maintenance. However, these 
operations can only be made after prior notification.72 Unlike Articles 
79 and 112, Article 51 makes no reference to pipelines. There is no 
freedom or right to install pipelines in the archipelagic waters. 
b.  Traditional Fishing Rights 
Traditional fishing rights are protected by Article 51. The term 
“traditional” is however open to interpretation. On the one hand, it 
may refer to the longstanding usage of fish resources by neighbouring 
States and it would then be synonym of customary rights.73 On 
the other hand, the word “traditional” in Article 51 may refer to the 
modalities of fishing, being thus synonym of artisanal. The owner of 
such rights is equally ambiguous: it may be either the neighbouring 
State or its nationals. The existing case-law has not entirely dispelled 
these ambiguities.74 For instance, the Barbados v. Trindade and Tobago 
award did not exclude that non-artisanal fishing by ice boats could have 
constituted “traditional fishing” under UNCLOS, provided that it had 
been undertaken for long enough to give rise to a tradition.75 And in 
the Eritrea/ Yemen decision, the commission considered that artisanal 
fishing did not exclusively refer to fishing according to methods of 
another age. It merely contrasted artisanal fishing to industrial fishing: 
“[T]he term ‘artisanal’ is not to be understood as applying in the 
72  See J.-P. Quéneudec, Chronique du droit de la mer. II. Câbles sous-marins, AFDI, 
1981, p. 679 ; L. Savagado, “Le régime international des câbles sous-marins”, JDI 
(Clunet), vol. 140, 2013, n.  1, pp. 45-82.
73  This is the meaning which stems out from the travaux préparatoires, but also from 
use of the word “traditional” in Article 47, paragraph 6. “The idea is not to infringe 
upon rights acquired through longstanding use by neighbouring States of archipelagic 
States of areas pertaining now to archipelagic waters when they were the high seas. 
Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, whose interests were adversely affected by the es-
tablishment of archipelagic baselines, demanded this safeguard in exchange for their 
acceptance of, and support for, the archipelagic claims of neighbouring States in the 
region, particularly Indonesia.” (C. J. Piernas, op. cit. note 12, para. 15). 
74  The Government of Sudan / The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army 
(Abyei Arbitration), award, 22 July 2009, paras. 754 -762. 
75  Arbitration between Barbados and the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, supra fn. 
27, p. 222, para. 266. Barbados claimed traditional rights not in Trinidad’s archipelag-
ic waters, but in its EEZ (as a relevant circumstance for shifting the equidistance line).
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future only to a certain type of fishing exactly as it is practised 
today. ‘Artisanal fishing’ is used in contrast to ‘industrial fishing’. 
It does not exclude improvements in powering the small boats, in 
the techniques of navigation, communication or in the techniques of 
fishing; but the traditional regime of fishing does not extend to large-
scale commercial or industrial fishing nor to fishing by nationals of 
third States in the Red Sea, whether small-scale or industrial.”76
The South China Sea award considerably restricts the meaning of 
“traditional fishing” in Article 51. First, it makes clear that:
“The legal basis for protecting artisanal fishing stems from the 
notion of vested rights and the understanding that, having pursued 
a livelihood through artisanal fishing over an extended period, 
generations of fishermen have acquired a right, akin to property, in 
the ability to continue to fish in the manner of their forebears (...). 
These are not the historic rights of States, as in the case of historic 
titles, but private rights.”77 
Second, for the SCS Tribunal, “traditional” refers to “artisanal” 
fishing. And unlike the Eritrea/ Yemen commission, the Tribunal did 
no leave open the possibility for changes and improvements in the 
modalities of fishing: 
“[T]traditional fishing rights extend to artisanal fishing that is 
carried out largely in keeping with the longstanding practice of the 
community (…), but not to industrial fishing that departs radically 
from traditional practices. (…) [T]he Tribunal notes that the methods 
of fishing protected under international law would be those that 
broadly follow the manner of fishing carried out for generations: 
in other words, artisanal fishing in keeping with the traditions and 
customs of the region.”78
And unlike the Eritrea/ Yemen Commission and the Barbados v. 
Trinidad and Tobago Tribunal, the SCS Tribunal considered that 
“traditional fishing rights” were superseded by the adoption of the 
Convention, except when they were specifically protected by one of 
its provisions. Thus, they could subsist in the archipelagic waters (by 
virtue of Article 51) and in the territorial sea (by virtue of Article 15), but 
76  Eritrea/Yemen, Arbitral Award, Second Stage of the Proceedings, 17 December 
1999, RIAA, vol. XXII, p. 360, para. 106.
77  South China Sea award, supra fn. 35, para. 798, emphasis added.
78  Ibid., para. 798 and para. 806, emphasis added. 
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not in the exclusive economic zone.79 The justification provided by the 
Tribunal is that “the exercise of freedoms permitted under international 
law cannot give rise to a historic right”.80 This rationale would seem to 
apply not only to fishing, but also to other liberties which States may 
seek to qualify as historic rights.
c.  Navigational Rights and Obligations: a Comparison between 
Innocent Passage and Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage
Subsistence of navigational freedoms is another essential component 
of the archipelagic compromise. The maritime powers obtained a 
double protection of their navigational rights and freedoms: first, 
Article 52 of UNCLOS provides for a right of innocent passage through 
archipelagic waters; second, Article 53 of UNCLOS creates a further 
right of archipelagic sea lanes passage (ASLP) in areas of archipelagic 
waters designated to that effect. Accordingly, Part IV incorporates by 
reference provisions relating to innocent passage through the territorial 
sea (namely Articles 17 to 32).81 As far as ASLP is concerned, Article 
53 defines it in terms similar if not identical to those applying to transit 
passage through straits used for international navigation.82 Moreover, 
Article 54 in Part IV incorporates by reference Part III of the Convention 
dealing with transit passage.83 The interpretation of provisions relating 
to innocent passage and transit passage becomes thus highly relevant 
for understanding the corresponding provisions in Part IV of the 
Convention. For the moment however, there is little judicial guidance 
on either innocent or transit passage.84 
79  Ibid., paras. 803-804.
80  South China Sea award, supra fn. 35, para. 268. 
81  Cf. Article 52, paragraph 1: “Ships of all States enjoy the right of innocent passage 
through archipelagic waters, in accordance with Part II, section 3” (emphasis added). 
See also The Düzgit Integrity Arbitration (Malta v. São Tomé and Príncipe), supra fn. 
34, 51para. 310.
82  Compare Art. 53 and Art. 38. H. Caminos and V. Cogliati-Bantz, identified very 
small drafting differences, which do not impact upon substance, op. cit. fn. 7, pp. 
185-186.
83  Article 54 (Duties of ships and aircraft during their passage, research and survey 
activities, duties of the archipelagic State and laws and regulations of the archipelagic 
State relating to archipelagic sea lanes passage) “Articles 39, 40, 42 and 44 apply 
mutatis mutandis to archipelagic sea lanes passage.”
84  The Corfu Channel judgment of the ICJ remains the reference, but it predates 
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Obvious differences separate the two rights of passage. Ratione 
personae, innocent passage applies to “ships of all States” (Art. 52 
(1)); ASLP is larger, since it covers “all ships and aircraft” ((Art. 53 
(2)). The terms “ships of all States” and “all ships” cover thus both 
civil and military ships (and aircrafts in case of ASLP). As underlined 
by H. Caminos and V. Cogliati-Bantz, “this granting clause makes no 
distinction between categories of ships and aircraft, their nationality or 
ownership, their status as warships or merchant ships, or civil or State 
aircraft. The right of transit passage applies literally to all types of ships 
and aircraft regardless of their individual characteristics”.85
Ratione loci, innocent passage applies in archipelagic waters, e.g. 
the waters landwards of the archipelagic baselines (Art. 49), and in the 
territorial sea, e.g. an area of 12 NM maximum measured seawards 
from the archipelagic baselines (Art. 48). If an archipelagic State has 
not drawn archipelagic baselines, the right of innocent passage will 
only apply in its territorial sea. ASLP is exercised in ASL, which are 
defined as a series of continuous axis lines from the entry to the exit 
points of passage routes. Ships passing through the archipelagic sea 
lanes should not deviate more than 25 nautical miles to either side of 
these axis lines (Art 53 (5)). Archipelagic sea lanes are thus constituted 
by a 50 NM navigational corridor where ASLP applies. In the absence 
of designation of ASL by the coastal State, the right of ASLP “may be 
exercised through the routes normally used for international navigation” 
(Art. 53 (12)).
Designation of Archipelagic Sea Lanes (ASL). Whereas the coastal 
State can unilaterally determine the archipelagic baselines (if it 
complies with Article 47 of the Convention)86, Article 53, paragraphs 
9 provides that the designation of ASL shall be done with the approval 
of the competent international organization. A similar provision can be 
found in Article 41, paragraph 7, applying to transit passage. So far, 
only Indonesia designated ASL,87 but this precedent is significant on 
UNCLOS. The Enrica Lexie arbitration (pending) is also expected to engage with the 
interpretation of UNCLOS articles on innocent passage through the territorial sea and 
freedom of passage on the high seas.
85  H. Caminos and V. Cogliati-Bantz, op. cit. fn. 7, p. 211.
86  See paras. 21-23 above. 
87  The Philippines have also initiated domestic consultations for the designation of 
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more than one account. 
First, it made clear that the International Maritime Organization 
is the only international organization competent for that purpose.88 At 
first, Indonesia contested this monopoly,89 but it finally agreed in 1996 
to submit a proposal to the IMO,90 drafted after consultations with its 
neighbouring countries and certain maritime powers. Following this 
episode, the General Provisions on Ships’ Routeing recognize that 
the “IMO is recognized as the competent international organization 
responsible for adopting archipelagic sea lanes”.91
Second, the validity of the Indonesian proposal was challenged 
on grounds that it did not “include all normal passage routes used as 
ASL, but in their present form, the proposals are incompatible with the Convention 
(see K. Baumert and B. Melchior, op. cit. note 19, p. 73; J. Kraska, R. Pedrozo, In-
ternational Maritime Security Law, Martinus Nijhoff, 2013, pp. 273-274; Alberto A. 
Encomienda, Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage and the Philippines Situation, Myron 
H. Nordquist, Tommy T. B. Koh and John Norton Moore (eds.), Freedom of the Seas, 
Passage Rights and the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2008, pp. 393-394). 
88  On the role of IMO under UNCLOS in general, see IMO Secretariat, Implications 
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea for the International Mari-
time Organization, doc. LEG/MISC.8 du 30 janvier 2014, disponible en ligne: http://
www.imo.org/fr/OurWork/Legal/Documents/LEG%20MISC%208.pdf. H. Oxman, 
“Environmental Protection in Archipelagic Waters and International Straits – The 
Role of the International Maritime Organisation”, International Journal of Marine and 
Coastal Law, vol. 10, 1995, p. 480
89  Indonesia was reluctant to submit the question an organization where the US have 
great influence, although they are not party to UNCLOS (see C. Johnson, “A Rite of 
Passage: The IMO Consideration of the Indonesian Archipelagic Sea-Lanes Submis-
sion”, The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, vol. 15, No. 3, 2000, pp. 
317-332; C. Forward, “Archipelagic Sea-Lanes in Indonesia. Their Legality in Inter-
national Law”, Australian and New Zealand Maritime Law Journal, vol. 23, 2009, 
n.  2, pp. 143-156, available online: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/ANZMar-
LawJl/2009/15.pdf (last accessed on 17 October 2017); A. Havas, “Archipelagic Sea 
Lanes Passage Designation: The Indonesian Experience”, in M. H. Nordquist et all 
(eds.), Freedom of the Seas, Passage Rights and the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, 
Brill-Nijhoff, 2009, pp. 385-391 and 455-457.
90  C. Forward, op. cit., p. 152. 
91  IMO Resolution A.572(14), Annex 2 (General provisions for the adoption, desig-
nation and substitution of archipelagic sea lanes) adopted on 19 May 1998. See also 
IMO, Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its 69th Session, 19 May 1998, 
IMO Doc. MSC. 71(69).
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routes for international navigation or overflight” (Art. 53 (4)).  The 
main vexed issue was the lack designation of an East/West sea lane 
through the archipelago via the Java Sea, while three North/South lanes 
were designated.92 The choice made by the IMO Security Committee 
was to consider Indonesia’s proposal as partial,93 which allowed for 
its adoption.94 However, with this partial designation, third States may 
still argue that they envoy ASLP “through the routes normally used for 
international navigation” (Art. 53 (12)). Indonesia was thus encouraged 
to complete the designation process, which the Government Regulation 
No. 37/2002 sought to achieve.95 However, this regulation legislates 
for the three North/South ASLs,96 but it still fails to identify East/
West sea lanes. While Art. 3 seems to imply that further ASLs may be 
designated, it also restricts the application of ASLP to the designated 
ASLs, an approach hardly compatible with Art. 53 (12) of UNCLOS. 
The partial designation created difficulties, for instance in 2003, 
when the US asserted that its aircrafts had a right to exercise ASLP in 
the East/West routes normally used for international navigation. In July 
2003, the US sent near the island of Bawean in Java Sea, the aircraft 
carrier USS Carl Vinson and five fighter aircrafts on manoeuvres, which 
were intercepted by the Indonesian authorities.97 The incident raised 
92  Indonesia refrained from designating ASL in the Java Sea because of security and 
environmental concerns (see H. Caminos and V. Cogliati-Bantz, op. cit. fn. 7, p. 215). 
93  A Partial archipelagic sea lanes proposal is defined by IMO General provisions as 
“An archipelagic sea lanes proposal by an archipelagic State which does not meet 
the requirement to include all normal passage routes and navigational channels as 
required by UNCLOS.” (IMO Resolution A.572(14), Annex 2, above fn. 92, Article 
2.2.2). Furthermore, the same text provides that : “When adopting a proposed archi-
pelagic sea lane, IMO will ensure that the proposed sea lane is in accordance with the 
relevant provisions of UNCLOS and determine if the proposal is a partial archipelagic 
sea lanes proposal. IMO may adopt only such archipelagic sea lanes as may be agreed 
by the Government of the proposing archipelagic State.” (Art. 3.2).
94  IMO, Maritime Safety Committee, 19 May 1998, Resolution MSC. 72(69).
95  Indonesian Government Regulation No. 37 on the Rights and Obligations of 
Foreign Ships and Aircraft Exercising the Right of Archipelagic Sea Lane Passage 
through Designated Archipelagic Sea Lanes, 28 June 2002, Law of the Sea Bulletin, 
no. 52, p. 20).
96  Ibid., Art. 11. 
97  On this incident, see V. Cay, “Archipelagic sea lanes passage and maritime security 
in archipelagic Southeast Asia”, 2010, The Maritime Commons, pp. 47-48, available 
online at: http://commons.wmu.se/ (last accessed on 17 October 2017); S. Bateman, 
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two different questions: on the one hand, could the US military aircraft 
exercise ASLP through these routes? Considering the letter of Art. 53 
(12) of UNCLOS and the IMO practice, the answer appears to be in 
the positive. On the other hand, it is doubtful that military, provocative 
manoeuvres are covered by ASLP.98
The ratione materiae differences between innocent passage and 
ASLP are equally substantial. The regime of innocent passage being 
considered insufficiently protective of their interests, the maritime 
powers sought to add to it the ASLP during the Third Conference. 
Innocent passage regime contains indeed several limitations: Coastal 
States can suspend it (cf. Art. 25(3) and Art. 5(2)), submarines are 
“required to navigate on the surface and show their flag” (Art. 20) and 
the coastal State may adopt laws and regulations applying to innocent 
passage, with a view to protecting their legitimate interests (Art. 21). 
ASLP on the other hand, is “unobstructed” transit through ASL, by all 
ships and aircraft navigating “in their normal mode” (Art. 53 (3)). 
Several grey areas subsist in relation to the substantive scope of 
innocent passage and of ASLP. The most vexed issues concern the 
military ships and aircrafts. Several States impose a requirement of 
notification or even prior authorisation for military engines. It is quite 
common for archipelagic States to impose in their domestic legislation 
a requirement of prior notification or even authorisation for the passage 
of warships. Antigua and Barbuda, Maldives, Seychelles, Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines and Vanuatu require prior authorization 
for warships, whereas the Dominican Republic, Mauritius, Maldives 
and Seychelles impose similar conditions on ships carrying nuclear or 
inherently dangerous or noxious substances.99 
While the authorization - notification requirement are generally 
“Security and the Law of the Sea in East Asia: Navigational Regimes and Exclusive 
Economic Zones”, in D. Freestone et all (eds.), The Law of the Sea: Progress and 
Prospects, OUP, 2006, pp. 365-387. 
98  See paras. 56-56 below. 
99  See the comprehensive “Table 1: State Practice on Limitations to Navigation” 
compiled by S. Kaye, “Freedom of Navigation in a post 9/11 World: Security and 




treated together,100 there is room for distinguishing between the two: 
according to its ordinary meaning, an authorization is “a document 
giving official permission”,101 whereas the notification consists of 
“informing (someone) of something, typically in a formal or official 
manner”.102 Thus, the authorization implies that the coastal State holds 
the power to decide whether a military ship or aircraft should be granted 
permission to transit through ASL (or even territorial sea). This would 
be incompatible with the right of transit and innocent passage. In the 
Corfu Channel case already, the ICJ held the authorisation requirement 
to be incompatible with the right of transit through straits: 
“It is, in the opinion of the Court, generally recognized and 
in accordance with international custom that States in time of 
peace have a right to send their warships through straits used for 
international navigation between two parts of the high seas without 
the previous authorization of a coastal State, provided that the 
passage is innocent. Unless otherwise prescribed in an international 
convention, there is no right for a coastal State to prohibit such 
passage through straits in time of peace.”103
However, this statement does not cover the requirement of prior 
notification. Moreover, the distinction between authorization and 
notification was envisaged during the discussions on the 1958 Geneva 
Convention on the territorial sea, where the majority of States were 
“favourable to a right of access of warships, subject only to a duty to 
notify the coastal State of intended passage”.104 There are also examples 
of State practice of prior notification, even if they are presented as the 
expression of a rule of comity and not as an international obligation.105 
100  See for instance H. Caminos and V. Cogliati-Bantz, op. cit. fn. 7, p. 181.
101  Oxford English Dictionary (online: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/, last visited 
on 17 October 2017).
102  Ibid.
103  Corfou Channel case, Merits, ICJ Reports 1949, p. 28. Some authors note that the 
Court only referred to passage through straits, not through the territorial sea, while 
they also conclude that its conclusions probably apply to the regime of innocent 
passage (N. Ronzitti, “Military Uses of the Sea”, D. Attard et all. (eds.), The IMLI 
Manual on International Maritime Law. Volume III: Marine Environmental Law and 
Maritime Security Law, OUP, 2016, pp. 543-545).
104  M.S. MacDougal, W.T. Burke, The Public Order of the Oceans: A Contemporary 
International Law of the Sea, New Haven Press, 1962, reprinted in 1985, p. 220.
105  See US Department of Defense, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Commander, 
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Activities during passage by military ships and the concept of 
“transit in their normal mode”. Another vexed question concerns the 
types of activities which may be undertaken by military ships while 
in innocent or transit passage. Some States106 claim that, since ASLP 
implies that ships and aircraft can navigate in their normal mode, this 
may imply military manoeuvres in the ASL.107 State practice does 
not necessarily support this view. Apart from the numerous domestic 
regulations imposing restrictions on military activities, the 19 Rules 
agreed to by the United States, Australia and Indonesia on the exercise 
of archipelagic sea lanes passage provide that “foreign warships and 
foreign military aircraft are not allowed to conduct war exercises or use 
live ammunition, nor to conduct a war game”.108 
“Implications [of] Indonesia’s Mare Nostrumi”, CINCPAC MSG 102244Z OCT 64 
Parts I and II, Oct. 19, 1964, quoted in J. Kraska, R. Pedrozo, International Maritime 
Security Law, Martinus Nijhoff, 2013, pp. 272-273. According to the 19 Rules agreed 
to by the United States, Australia and Indonesia “foreign warships, as well as ships 
using nuclear energy, passing through sea lanes, are recommended to inform the In-
donesian Government . . . in advance” (quoted in H. Caminos and V. Cogliati-Bantz, 
op. cit. fn. 7, p. 195).
106  US Freedom of Navigation Assertions Program (this is described in the following 
terms: “Freedom of navigation operational assertions (FONAs) are a mission carried 
out mainly by the U.S. Navy. The mission is to ensure that when other nations impose 
what the United States considers excessive restrictions on the freedom of navigation 
(FON) in any place in the world, the Pentagon will send naval ships or aircraft to dem-
onstrate that the United States will not accept such restrictions.” (A. Etzioni, “Free-
dom of Navigation Assertions: The United States as the World’s Policeman”, Armed 
Forces & Society, 2015, pp. 1-2). See also U.S. Department of Defense Freedom 
of Navigation Program Fact Sheet? March 2015, available online at: http://policy.
defense.gov/Portals/11/Documents/gsa/cwmd/DoD%20FON%20Program%20--%20
Fact%20Sheet%20(March%202015).pdf, last accessed: 17 October 2017).
107  The Resolutions of Advice and Consent approved by the U.S. Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee (SFRC) in 2004 and 2007 include the following definition: “(B) 
“normal mode” includes, inter alia – (i) submerged transit of submarines; (ii) over-
flight by military aircraft, including in military formation; (iii) activities necessary for 
the security of surface warships, such as formation steaming and other force protec-
tion measures; (iv) underway replenishment; and (v) the launching and recovery of 
aircraft;” (quoted in A. Roach and R. Smith, Excessive Maritime Claims, op. cit. fn. 
38, pp. 274-275).
108  This was a discussion document during the IMO negotiations on designation, by 
Indonesia, of ASL. They are not meant to be a binding instrument. They are partially 
quoted by H. Caminos and V. Cogliati-Bantz, op. cit. fn. 7, pp. 193-195. Indonesian 
Government Regulation No. 37/2002 Article 4(4) uses the same formulation.
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More importantly, military activities in transit are hardy compatible 
with the meaning of “passage”. Article 18 of UNCLOS defines 
“passage” as “continuous and expeditious” navigation through the 
territorial sea. Article 38, paragraph 2 uses similar terms for defining 
transit passage: “2. Transit passage means the exercise in accordance 
with this Part of the freedom of navigation and overflight solely for 
the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of the strait between 
one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another 
part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone”.109 Consequently, 
the Düzgit Integrity tribunal noted, in relation to innocent passage in 
archipelagic waters, that “the notion of ‘passage’ requires continuous 
and expeditious navigation through the territorial sea or archipelagic 
waters. Stopping or anchoring are only covered by ‘passage’ if these 
are incidental to ordinary navigation”.110 Consequently, “foreign ship 
may not commence STS [ship to ship] operations in the waters under 
sovereignty of a coastal State without authorisation”.111 
Prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction. The Tribunal did not put 
into question the prescriptive jurisdiction of São Tomé to submit to 
authorisation activities which are not covered by the right of innocent 
passage. It equally considered that the coastal State was entitled to take 
enforcement measures to ensure compliance with its regulations: 
“The Tribunal considers that São Tomé acted lawfully and in 
accordance with its law enforcement jurisdiction resulting from 
its sovereignty over its archipelagic waters in relation to Düzgit 
Integrity on 15 March 2013. The Master knew that Düzgit Integrity 
had an obligation to obtain permission prior to entering São Tomé’s 
waters for making any transhipment. (…) In the Tribunal’s view, the 
measures taken by São Tomé were necessary to ensure compliance 
with its laws and regulations adopted in conformity with the 
Convention.”112 
The Tribunal was referring to enforcement jurisdiction in archipelagic 
waters. The discussion as to whether States can adopt enforcement 
measures against ships exercising ASLP needs careful analysis within 
the framework of enforcement jurisdiction under UNCLOS and general 
109  Emphasis added.
110  The Düzgit Integrity Arbitration, supra fn. 34, para. 310.
111  Ibid., para. 237.
112  Ibid., paras. 235-236. 
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international law and goes beyond the scope of this article. In a nutshell, 
there are two opposing views. Some may argue that innocent passage 
and transit passage differ in this respect too. While Article 25(1) on 
innocent passage confers upon the coastal State the right “to prevent 
passage which is not innocent”, there is no equivalent provision for 
transit passage or ASLP. Notably, Article 42 provides that the coastal 
State can adopt regulations in respect of the safety of navigation, 
pollution, fishing, loading or unloading of goods and persons, but it 
contains no express enforcing empowerment. Hugo Caminos considers 
this to be a compelling argument denoting the absence of enforcement 
jurisdiction against ships exercising transit passage and ASLP.113 
However, “under general international law the coastal state may 
take any steps necessary to enforce compliance with its law and 
regulation”114, unless a prohibitive rule provides it from doing so (like 
the rules on immunities). In this respect, in relation to military ships, 
Article 42, paragraph 5 provides for the international responsibility of 
the flag State “of a ship (…) or aircraft entitled to sovereign immunity”. 
Thus, a coastal State could not adopt enforcement measures in relations 
to military ships exercising transit or archipelagic sea-lanes passage. 
This provision may be interpreted as providing for the only mechanism 
available to archipelagic States for putting an end to violations of their 
laws by military aircraft. By contrast, there is no equivalent provisions 
for commercial ships. Therefore, the archipelagic (or transit) State can 
reasonably consider that they do not enjoy any form of “immunity” 
from enforcement jurisdiction, if they violate its laws and regulations.
It is often said that the archipelagic regime is a “tertium genus”115 
(or even quartum genus) combining characteristics of internal waters, 
territorial sea and straits used for international navigation. But this 
113  H. Caminos, “Enforcement jurisdiction under the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea. An overview”, in Coexistence, Cooperation and Solidarity. Liber 
Amicorum Rüdiger Wolfrum, vol. I, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012, pp. 752-753.
114  J. Crawford, Bronwlie’s Principles of Public International Law, 8th ed., OUP, 
2012, p. 268. UNCLOS tribunals have already had the occasion to consider that a 
coastal State enjoys the inherent power to enforce its laws and regulations, validly 
applicable in its EEZ: M/V “Virginia G” (Panama/Guinea-Bissau), Judgment, ITLOS 
Reports 2014, p. 4, paras. 251-254, 308; The Arctic Sunrise Arbitration (Netherlands 
v. Russia), op. cit. fn. 55.
115  C. J. Piernas, op. cit. fn. 12, para. 13. 
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genus is still to be clarified. Before 2016, the archipelagic status has 
marginally been addressed by the ICJ or any arbitral tribunal. Only two 
decisions, the 2001 ICJ judgment in Qatar v. Bahrein and the 2006 
arbitral award in Barbados v. Trindad and Tobago, referred incidentally 
to Part IV of UNCLOS, without any in-depth analysis of its provisions. 
The 2016 vintage is exceptional: the South China Sea award and the 
Düzgit Integrity award bring welcome clarifications on the conditions 
set out for assessing the validity of archipelagic proclamations (Articles 
46 and 47 of UNCLOS) and, to some extent, on the rules governing 
activities in archipelagic waters. Some of the judicial conclusions 
set out therein were foreseeable, since the text of the provision to be 
interpreted left little room for doubt. Others are more audacious, either 
because they depart from existing case-law (like the South China Sea 
interpretation on traditional fishing rights) or because they import into 
the Convention other rules of general international law (as the Düzgit 
Integrity Tribunal did in relation to the general principle of reasonabless). 
It remains to be seen if these decisions correctly assess the state of 
the law and if their progressive development dimension will ripen into 
consensual interpretation of Part IV UNCLOS. As it remains to be seen 
if the numerous deliberate ambiguities, concerning the protection of 
legitimate interests of neighbouring States or the navigational rights 
and obligations, will be dispelled by convergent State practice or some 
other judicial decisions.
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